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This paper investigates the internal validity of investment–cashﬂow sensitivity to mea-
sure ﬁnancial constraints under information asymmetry, using the opportunity provided
by the Value Added Tax (VAT) reform in China. Since Fazzari et al. (1988), investment–
cashﬂow sensitivity has been one of the most important indicators used to measure ﬁnan-
cial constraints and one of the basic models used to test Myers and Majluf’s (1984) pecking
order hypothesis. Fazzari et al. (1988) state that if there is no difference between the cost
of internal and external ﬁnancing, investment and ﬁnancing is irrelevant. However, the
presence of information asymmetry increases the relative cost of external ﬁnancing. The
higher the degree of information asymmetry, the greater the external ﬁnancial constraints
and investment will rely more on internal ﬁnancing, i.e., operating cashﬂow. Therefore,
investment–cashﬂow sensitivity can be used to measure ﬁnancial constraints under
information asymmetry.
However, Poterba (1988), Cleary (1999), Erickson and Whited (2000), Kaplan and
Zingales (1997, 2000), Almeida et al. (2004), Alti (2003) and Bushman et al. (2008) have
questioned the validity of this indicator from different perspectives. Based on an analytical
model, Kaplan and Zingales (1997, 2000) show that investment–cashﬂow sensitivity
cannot effectively measure the cost of external ﬁnancial constraints. Bushman et al.
(2008) argue that the existing investment–cashﬂow sensitivity model actually reﬂects
the correlation between investment in ﬁxed assets and working capital. As a result, these
authors have proposed competing indicators.
This study uses an exogenous event, VAT reform, to investigate the internal validity of
investment–cashﬂow sensitivity as a measure of ﬁnancial constraints. Internal validity is
the ability of a research design to rule out other theories. The stronger the exclusiveness
of the research design, the higher the internal validity. Although previous studies assume
that a company’s operating cashﬂow is given, operating cashﬂow is affected by both the
proﬁtability of a company and the level of corporate taxes. Under tax reform, companies
receive tax subsidies and their operating cashﬂow increases. If ﬁrms invest more and there
is an increasing relationship between investment and operating cashﬂow, this obviously
cannot be explained by changes in the company’s ﬁnancial constraints under information
asymmetry. Exogenous tax reform seldom changes the inherent information asymmetry
between companies and capital markets, including ﬁnancial constraints. It does, however,
change the extent to which investment decisions depend on operating cashﬂows. If so,
investment–cashﬂow sensitivity may not always reﬂect the status of information asym-
metry-based external ﬁnancial constraints, i.e. it is a measure with less internal validity.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing liter-
ature. Section 3 presents our hypothesis development. Section 4 provides the sample
selection and description of variables. Section 5 presents the empirical test results and
analysis, and Section 6 concludes.
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In frictionless capital markets, there is no difference between internal and external
ﬁnancing costs, which implies that there is no relationship between investment and
ﬁnancing. It is also a basic assumption of Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) capital structure
irrelevance theory. However, under asymmetric information (Akerlof, 1970), external
ﬁnancing will cause adverse selection and reduce ﬁrm value. Therefore, companies have
to give priority to internal ﬁnancing, then to debt ﬁnancing and ﬁnally to equity ﬁnancing,
which is called pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984).
Pecking order theory and trade-off theory are two competing views on capital structure
and many studies have focused on which theory has more explanatory power (Fama and
French, 2002; Shyam-Sunder and Myers, 1999; Frank and Goyal, 2000, 2008). Other stud-
ies have tested the extended pecking order hypothesis, for example, the market reaction to
SEOs (Smith, 1986; Eckbo et al., 2006) and the ﬁnancial constraints hypothesis (Smith,
1986; Eckbo et al., 2006).
In their seminal paper, Fazzari et al. (1988) argue that pecking order theory can explain
companies’ investment behavior when facing external ﬁnancial constraints. Information
asymmetry and agency costs increase the cost of external ﬁnancing. To minimize the cost
of capital, companies will prefer internal ﬁnancing from their operating cashﬂow. When a
company’s operating cashﬂow cannot meet its investment needs, the company will turn to
external ﬁnancing. Therefore, the higher the investment–cashﬂow sensitivity, the higher
the implicit costs of external ﬁnancing and the higher the ﬁnancial constraints. Invest-
ment–cashﬂow sensitivity has been used as an important measure of ﬁnancial constraints
in ﬁnance and accounting research (Biddle and Hilar, 2006; Beatty et al., 2007; Cleary et al.,
2007; Lyandres, 2007; Polk and Sapienza, 2008; Pulvino and Tarhan, 2006; McNichols and
Stubben, 2008).
Although the theory of ﬁnancial constraints is widely accepted by scholars, there is con-
siderable controversy about the validity of using investment–cashﬂow sensitivity as a
proxy. Kaplan and Zingales (1997, 2000) show that after controlling for growth opportu-
nities, the relationship between investment and operating cashﬂow is uncertain. Bushman
et al. (2008) argue that changes in operating cashﬂow and increased investment in ﬁxed
assets must be accompanied by an increase in working capital. Therefore, the invest-
ment–cashﬂow sensitivity may reﬂect, to a certain extent, the relationship between
investment in ﬁxed assets and working capital. This is a natural phenomenon arising from
the expansion of a company’s investment and it cannot be used to explain the company’s
cost of external ﬁnancing.
Chinese scholars have conducted several studies to examine whether investment–
cashﬂow sensitivity can be used to measure the ﬁnancial constraints of listed companies
in China, with inconsistent conclusions. Feng (1999) divide their sample into two groups
according to the existence and non-existence of ﬁnancial constraints, using the standard of
whether the company is one of the 300 pivotal enterprises appointed by the State Eco-
nomic and Trade Commission, one of the 212 companies organized under the main bank
system’s support, or one of the 120 state pivotal enterprise groups. They investigate the
effect of cashﬂow on investment levels in these samples and ﬁnd that government-
sponsored enterprises are almost free from internal cashﬂow. Wei and Liu (2004) show
that ﬁnancial constraints and investment–cashﬂow sensitivity have a signiﬁcant positive
relationship. Guo and Ma (2009) ﬁnd that compared with state-owned listed companies,
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cashﬂow sensitivity is greater during periods of low bank lending rates than during
periods of high bank lending rates. On the contrary, Guo and He (2008) ﬁnd that invest-
ment–cashﬂow sensitivity has a non-binding relationship with ﬁnancial constraints, in a
sample divided according to the level of state ownership, return on net assets and enter-
prise size.
Academics have also studied the factors affecting ﬁnancial constraints. For example, Lian
and Cheng (2007) ﬁnd that companies with fewer ﬁnancial constraints show a stronger
investment–cashﬂow sensitivity and tend to over-invest. Whereas companies facing more
serious ﬁnancial constraints suffer from under-investment, with information asymmetry
as the main cause of cashﬂow sensitivity. Wang et al. (2008) conﬁrm that higher corporate
ﬁnancial constraints are linked to higher investment–cashﬂow sensitivity, but they ﬁnd
that asymmetric information theory cannot fully explain the relationship between
ﬁnancial constraints and investment–cashﬂow sensitivity.
These mixed ﬁndings are likely due to engoneneity problems and fail to take into
account China’s tax system and its reforms, which could lead to measurement bias when
using investment–cashﬂow sensitivity to measure ﬁnancial constraints. Based on the re-
sults of our analytical model, we ﬁnd that investment–cashﬂow sensitivity increases dur-
ing the tax reform, which is indicative of increased ﬁnancial constraints. We also compare
this result to some other measurements of ﬁnancial constraints to identify more robust
measures.3. Hypothesis development
3.1. Institutional background of VAT reform
To minimize endogeneity problems, we use China’s VAT reform pilot in 2004 and
analyze its effect on investment–cashﬂow sensitivity. VAT has been the most important
source of revenue, accounting for more than 35% of state tax revenues since 1994. From
1994 to 2008, production-based VAT, calculated as sales revenue minus the purchasing
cost of raw materials was implemented in China.
In 2004, the Ministry of Finance and State Administration of Taxation issued ‘‘Several
Issues on Value-Added Tax Provisions in Northeast China’’ (Tax [2004] No. 156), allowing
general taxpayers in six industries in Northeast China (including Heilongjiang, Jilin, and
Liaoning Province) to recover input VAT on purchases of ﬁxed assets. This was a pilot
for changing from production-based VAT to consumption-based VAT (hereinafter abbrevi-
ated as the VAT pilot) beginning in July 2004. In 2005, the input tax deduction from ﬁxed
assets changed from an incremental deduction to a full deduction. In 2006, the pilot was
expanded to Central and Western China. In January 2009, the VAT reform was imple-
mented nationwide.
There are several advantages in studying the VAT pilot in China: (1) As a national policy,
VAT is completely exogenous to corporate decision-making which avoids endogeneity is-
sues. At the same time, it is unlikely to affect the information asymmetry between capital
markets and companies, or at least will not lead to an increase in information asymmetry.
(2) The pilot was implemented only in Northeast China, leaving companies in other
regions still facing production-based VAT, providing a natural control sample. (3) Value-
Added Tax should change neither the company’s investment spending nor its income
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current period, namely internal ﬁnancing costs, without affecting external ﬁnancing costs.2
Based on the above features, if there is a signiﬁcant change in investment–cashﬂow under
the VAT reform, it will challenge the internal validity of investment–cashﬂow sensitivity
as proxy for ﬁnancial constraints.33.2. VAT and investment–cashﬂow sensitivity
As mentioned earlier, China implemented production-based VAT before the Value-
Added Tax reform, and does not allow companies to recover input tax on the purchase
of ﬁxed assets from the output tax on products and services in the same period. Because
China’s VAT is based on prices excluding tax, VAT is not part of current costs and is not
reﬂected in the income statement, thus it will not affect income tax payable in the current
period. Although ﬁrms are not allowed to recover the VAT on ﬁxed assets, it can be in-
cluded in the initial value of ﬁxed assets. Thus, VAT will reduce income tax liability in
the future period through depreciation, thereby reducing corporate income tax costs. Thus,
under production-based VAT, product sales and VAT on raw materials will not affect the
company’s operating proﬁt and operating cashﬂow. Input VAT on the purchase of ﬁxed as-
sets does not affect the company’s procurement operating cashﬂow, but can increase fu-
ture operating cashﬂow by increasing depreciation.
Under production-based VAT, the company’s operating cashﬂow after tax and the VAT
due after making an investment can be expressed as follows:1 Sin
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that aOCF1 ¼ NI1 þ FC1 ¼ ðS VCÞ  Ið1þ svÞN
 
ð1þ scÞ þ Ið1þ svÞN ; ð1Þwhere NI1 represents net proﬁt after tax; FC1 represents the amount of depreciation of
investments for each year of operation under production-based VAT; S is sales revenue;
VC is raw material costs; and I is the amount of investment in ﬁxed assets. The corporate
income tax rate and VAT tax rate are expressed as sc, sv, respectively, assuming ﬁxed assetce the income tax reform in 2008, the change in the tax rate affects the company’s future proﬁtability and external
ing tax shield while changing the company’s cost of external ﬁnancing. As this situation does not provide a clean
mental environment, we did not use the comprehensive VAT reform in 2009 as the research event in this study. The
added tax reform in 2004 can better explore the relationships between the pilot sample companies and investment
ing when the income tax remains unchanged.
e VAT reform reduces future operating cashﬂows. Investors will decrease the expected future earnings of current
ment, which leads to higher ﬁnancing costs, but will also expect the return on investment of projects to change due to
investment costs and higher revenue under the VAT reform. Therefore, these factors do not directly result in future
tation declines and higher external ﬁnance costs. In addition, the reduction in internal ﬁnancing does not mean that
ial constraints increase, particularly as the result of an increase in information asymmetry. As emphasized in the classical
of ﬁnancial constraints, it is information asymmetry that results in the cost difference between internal and external
ing. Under the VAT reform, there is no reason to believe that an increase in investment-cashﬂow sensitivity is due to
etric information.
subsidies may lead to increased proﬁtability, and thus banks should be more willing to provide loans to businesses.
lization of the Northeast should then lead to companies having easier access to bank loans. These effects will result in a
ion in corporate ﬁnancial constraints, but will not result in an increase in ﬁnancial constraints based on the investment-
ow model. Therefore, the effect of these factors is a ‘‘bias against’’, and will not affect the conclusions of this study. The
is also based on previous research on the measurement of ﬁnancial constraints. We examine the time-series variation of
vidend policy, asset-liability ratio and the average cash holdings in the pilot areas and non-pilot areas, and we do not ﬁnd
stematic differences around the existence of the pilot in different regions. The descriptive evidence suggests that events
re exogenous to the VAT reform do not lead to an increase in ﬁnancial constraints.
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ciation period is N. Because sales (purchases) receive (pay) an equivalent output tax (input
tax), VAT does not affect the company’s current operating cashﬂow.
Under the consumption-based VAT system, VAT input tax (hereinafter abbreviated as
input tax) on the purchase of ﬁxed assets can be recovered in the current period, which
directly reduces the company’s current Value-Added Tax expenditure and increases the
company’s current operating cashﬂow. At the same time, because VAT is not included in
the initial value of ﬁxed assets, this leads to a reduction in depreciation, directly increasing
the company’s proﬁtability and income tax expense during the period and reducing future
operating cashﬂow.
Under consumption-based VAT, the company’s operating cashﬂow after tax and VAT on
investment management can be expressed asOCF2 ¼ NI2 þ FC2 ¼ ðS VCÞ  IN
 
ð1 scÞ þ IN ; ð2Þwhere NI2 refers to net proﬁt after tax, and FC2 represents the amount of depreciation dur-
ing each operating year after an investment is made under consumption-based VAT.
Clearly, compared with Eq. (1), VAT is not included in the depreciation of ﬁxed assets,
therefore the operating cashﬂow declines during the period under consumption-based
VAT. The marginal decline isDOCF ¼  Isvsc
N
: ð3Þ
However, under the consumption-based VAT system, VAT on ﬁxed assets is deductible
in the current period, which directly increases the operating cashﬂow of the current
period:DOCF INV ¼ Isv : ð4Þ
The effect of the VAT reform on net operating cashﬂow is thenIsv 
XN
t¼1
Isvsc=N
ð1þ RÞt ; ð5Þwhere R is the discount rate. The remaining variables are deﬁned earlier.
Eq. (5) has two important implications: First, the VAT reform, in essence, reduces the
cost of investment by way of tax subsidies, which has a positive effect. Second, the depre-
ciation of ﬁxed assets decreases after the VAT reform, thereby reducing future operating
cashﬂows, which has a negative effect. As the income tax rate is always less than 1, the
VAT reform can directly increase the companies’ operating cashﬂows. This means that
the VAT reform can directly increase companies’ current operating cashﬂow.
3.3. Analysis of the effect of VAT transform on investment–cashﬂow sensitivity
To determine whether the VAT reform affects companies’ investment–cashﬂow sensitiv-
ity, based on Kaplan and Zingales (1997), we set the investment objective function asmax½FðIÞ  CðE;KÞ  I; ð6Þ
C refers to ﬁnancial constraints, a convex function of investment, which means the ﬁrst
derivative is greater than 0 and the second derivative is greater than 0. F is the return
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the second derivative is less than 0. E represents the amount of external ﬁnancing, that is,
I = E +W, where W is internal operating cashﬂow. K is the difference between the cost of
external ﬁnancing and internal ﬁnancing. To maximize investment gains, F(I), the scale
of investment I should be:4 To
the in
deprec
the ta
deprecF1ðIÞ ¼ 1þ C1ðI W ; kÞ; ð7Þ
where the ﬁrst and the second subscript refer to the ﬁrst derivative and second derivative
of I (and hereinafter).
The scale of the effect of internal ﬁnancing capacity on investment can be obtained by
the implicit functional derivative of Eq. (7):dI
dW
¼ C11
C11  F11 > 0: ð8ÞBecause C is a convex function and F is a concave function, investment and operating
cashﬂow have a positive relationship in an incomplete market.
Operating cashﬂow increases under the VAT reform, that is, E = I  (w + It),4 where, sup-
posing tv is the VAT rate, the drawback tax rate can be deﬁned as t ¼ tv1þtv . Using the implicit
functional derivation method, we obtaindI
dW
¼ C11ð1 tÞC11  F11 > 0: ð9ÞClearly, if (9) > (8), the VAT reform will increase the company’s investment–cashﬂow
sensitivity. Thus, this paper proposes the following research hypothesis:
Hypothesis. The VAT reform signiﬁcantly increases companies’ investment–cashﬂow
sensitivity.4. Sample selection and variable deﬁnitions
4.1. Sample and control sample selection
The sample is selected from A-share companies listed on China’s stock exchanges and
data is extracted from the CCER database. To isolate the inﬂuence of the VAT reform, we
refer to the methodology used by Aharony et al. (2000). The sample period is from 2001
to 2006. Enterprises in the three Northeastern provinces (Jilin, Liaoning, Heilongjiang) that
meet the conditions are selected as the research sample, and enterprises that meet the
conditions and are from other areas are selected as the control sample. We investigate
whether investment–cashﬂow sensitivities increased signiﬁcantly in listed companies
from the three Northeast provinces following the VAT reform.
To ensure the validity of our conclusions, we exclude the following ﬁrm-year data:simplify the discussion, we assume that ﬁxed assets are purchased at the end of the year, thus we do not need to consider
ﬂuence of depreciation on operating cashﬂow during the period in which the asset was purchased. On the one hand,
iation occurs mainly in future operating periods. On the other hand, a long-term service life limits the possible effect of
x shield on operating cashﬂow, even if there is depreciation in the current period. Including the investment period
iation factors alters the formulas slightly but does not affect the conclusions.
Table 1
Sample distribution by industry.a
Equipment
manufacturing
industry
Petroleum,
chemical
industry
Metallurgy
industry
Transportation and
equipment
manufacturing
Agricultural product
processing industry
Total
Northeast 30 84 30 36 48 228
Others 498 714 216 156 540 2124
Total 528 798 246 192 588 2352
a Because the industry code in the CCER database is only to level 3, ﬁrms in the ship manufacturing and automobile
manufacturing industries all belong to ‘‘C75 transportation equipment manufacturing industry’’. As we cannot subdivide
these two industries, they are merged into the ‘‘transportation and equipment manufacturing’’ industry. This simpliﬁcation
does not affect the results.
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tain industries enjoyed the beneﬁts of the input-VAT deduction, non-related indus-
tries are not in our research scope and are thus eliminated. We refer to The Listed
Company Industry Guidelines released in April 2001 by the China Securities Regulatory
Commission for the VAT reform-related or non-related industry base. The VAT
reform-related industries are divided according to the State Administration of Taxation
[2004] 156 date ﬁle, including equipment manufacturing, petrochemical, metallurgy,
shipping manufacturing, ship and ﬂoating device manufacturing, automobile manu-
facturing, and agricultural product processing. Because the industry codes for some
listed companies in the existing database are unclear, which may inﬂuence the accu-
racy of the conclusions, we also remove this data.5
(2) Companies with missing ﬁrm-year data between 2001 and 2006. Excluding these
companies ensures that all sample ﬁrms have observations before and after the
VAT reform, and also balances the panel data to ensure the samples are fully compa-
rable. We therefore rule out the possibility that the research conclusions result from
differences in the samples before and after the VAT reforms.
Following the above selection process, our sample includes 2352 ﬁrm-year observations
from 392 companies. A total of 228 ﬁrm-year observations from 38 companies are from
the three Northeastern provinces and 2124 ﬁrm-year observations from 354 companies
are from other locations. Table 1 shows the industry distribution of the samples. The
equipment manufacturing industry is the largest sector, with 528 observations, and trans-
portation and equipment manufacturing is the smallest, with 192 observations. Thus, the
sample selected in our research is representative.4.2. Variable deﬁnitions
4.2.1. Dependent variable
In the paper, we use ‘‘cash payout in the acquisition and construction of ﬁxed assets,
intangible assets and other long-term assets’’ divided by total assets at the beginning of
each year as a measure of ﬁxed asset investment,6 presented as lnv. After the VAT re-5 These industries are ‘‘communication equipment, computer and other electronic equipment manufacturing’’, which does not
affect the conclusions of this paper. Only the signiﬁcance of the full sample regression is affected, whereas the divided sample
regression results remain unchanged.
6 In this paper, we also test a different method for measuring the scale of ﬁxed asset investment. The conclusions do not
change signiﬁcantly.
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VAT is included in the other areas. In the descriptive statistics, we also examine the
investment in the Northeast multiplied by 1.17 to eliminate the effect of the inconsis-
tency between the variables. We also use the above adjusted data in the regressions.
4.2.2. Main explanatory variables
We deﬁne enterprise operating cashﬂow as ‘‘net operating cashﬂow + tax fee paid + tax
returned from the government’’ divided by total assets at the beginning of each year,7 pre-
sented as Opcash.
According to the theoretical analysis in this paper, the VAT reform should increase the
operating cashﬂow in that period, and will also increase the investment and cashﬂow sen-
sitivities. Thus, we expect the VAT reform to signiﬁcantly increase the investment–cash-
ﬂow sensitivities in Northeast listed companies after 2004. In this paper we focus on
whether investment–cashﬂow sensitivity is signiﬁcantly greater than 0 in the Northeast
listed companies after 2004. We deﬁne ‘‘After’’ as a dummy variable that equals 1 for
the years after 2004, and 0 otherwise. ‘‘Db’’ is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a ﬁrm
is located in the Northeast, and 0 otherwise. We investigate whether the coefﬁcient of
Db  After  Opcash is signiﬁcantly greater than 0.
To ensure the completeness of the model, we also interact each pair of Opcash, Db and
After. However, these interactions are not the focus of this study and we do not forecast
the directions of these interactions.
4.2.3. Control variables
Based on previous studies, we include the following control variables: (1) Tobinq is used
as the proxy for growth. The higher the growth, the greater the opportunities for invest-
ment and the more likely that ﬁrms are to invest in ﬁxed assets. We expect Tobinq and
investment to be positively related. (2) Size is measured as the logarithm of total assets
at the beginning of the year, which is used to control for scale. (3) Loan equals companies’
long-term liabilities (long-term loans plus bonds payable) divided by total assets at the
beginning of each year. Myers (1977) insists that the stronger the debt constraint, the
weaker the will to invest. According to the debt bonding theory, this variable should be
negatively related to investment. However, because of the widespread soft budget con-
straints in China’s state-owned enterprises, it may be negatively correlated with invest-
ment. (4) New loans (Loanchg) are measured as the change in loans divided by total
assets at the beginning of each year (loans = short-term borrowing + short-term bonds + -
long-term debt due within 1 year + long-term loans + bonds payable).8 When a company’s
investment increases, it usually increases loan ﬁnancing at the same time, so we expect this
variable and investment to be positively related.
4.2.4. Other variables
To further test related theories, we also use the following variables. (1) Cash holding
(Cashchg): measured as the change in cash and cash equivalents divided by total assets7 Tax payments and returns are not included in operating cashﬂow, because tax may be affected by the different tax rates and
tax policies in different regions and also because tax is not controllable for the enterprise. The cashﬂow computed in this way is
more comparable. In a robustness check, we also use the operating cashﬂow without adjusting tax as the independent variable,
and the conclusions are unchanged.
8 When we compute company loans using only bank loans (long term loans + short term loans) and use it to calculate debt
constraints (loan) and increased loans (Loanchg), the conclusions are unchanged.
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measure ﬁnancial slack as ‘‘dividend payment + capital expenditure + change in operating
funds + long term loans due within 1 year  operating cashﬂow.’’ However, they were
interested in the inﬂuence of ﬁnancial demands on long-term debt, whereas in this paper
we are interested in the effect of internal ﬁnancial demands on enterprise credit capacity.
To better meet the requirements for testing ﬁnancial constraint theory, we measure it as
‘‘(dividend payment + capital expenditure + change in operating funds + long-term loans
due within 1 year  operating cashﬂow)/total assets at the beginning of each year.’’ Divi-
dend payment is derived from ‘‘cash dividends, distributed proﬁts and interest payments’’
in the cash-ﬂow statement, capital expenditure is derived from ‘‘cash payouts for the
acquisition and construction of ﬁxed assets, intangible assets and other long-term assets’’,
change in operating funds is derived from ‘‘decrease in inventory + decrease in operating
receivables + increase in operating payables’’ in the cash-ﬂow statement, and operating
cashﬂow is derived from ‘‘net cashﬂow from operating activities’’ in the cash-ﬂow
statement.
The main regression model is as follows:Table 2
Descr
Var
Mea
p50
sd
99%
1%
Notes:
of totaInv i;t ¼ Opcashi;t þ Dbi þ Afteri;t þ Dbi  Afteri;t þ Dbi  Opcashi;t þ Afteri;t
 Opcashi;t þ Dbi  Afteri;t  Opcashi;t þ Tobinqi;t þ Loani;t þ Sizei;t; ð10Þwhere subscript i represents companies and subscript t represents years.
4.3. Descriptive statistics and correlation analysis
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics. To avoid the possibility that extreme values
may affect the conclusions, the continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% level. The
investment ratio (Inv, investment divided by total assets at the beginning of each year,
hereafter abbreviated as the proportion of investment) has a mean of 0.063, a median of
0.042 and a standard deviation of 0.066. The operating cashﬂow percentage (Opcash),
the main explanatory variable, has an average of 0.062, a median of 0.057 and a standard
deviation of 0.079. This highlights the considerable difference in investment and operating
cashﬂow among the sample companies.
The average proportion of debt in relation to total assets (Loan) is 0.053, whereas the
average change in debt (Loanchg) is 0.034, which indicates an increasing trend for com-
pany debt. The average of Deﬁcit is 0.045, which demonstrates that most companies can-
not satisfy their investment requirements from their own funds, thus they need to resort
to outside funding. The average of Tobinq is 2.218 and the average of size is 9.209, from
which it can be inferred that the average asset size is 1 billion yuan.iptive statistics (based on 2352 observations).
iables Inv Opcash Cashchg Loan Loanchg Deﬁcit Tobinq Size
n 0.063 0.062 0.01 0.053 0.034 0.045 2.218 9.209
0.042 0.057 0.002 0.024 0.013 0.039 1.756 9.188
0.066 0.079 0.084 0.072 0.114 0.144 1.336 0.376
percentile 0.34 0.315 0.357 0.382 0.544 0.632 7.834 10.259
percentile 0 0.224 0.243 0 0.275 0.416 0.691 8.333
Size = Ln (total assets at the beginning of the year); the 1% percentile of Inv equals 0 because investment is a small part
l assets and is rounded off to 0.
Table 3
Pearson correlation matrix.
Inv Opcash Cashchg Loan Loanchg Deﬁcit Tobinq
Opcash 0.29***
(0.00)
Cashchg 0.02 0.39***
(0.25) (0.00)
Loan 0.18*** 0.09*** 0.02
(0.00) (0.00) (0.26)
Loanchg 0.46*** 0.11*** 0.24*** 0.03
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.21)
Deﬁcit 0.36*** 0.70*** 0.30*** 0.06*** 0.45***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Tobinq 0.04*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.16*** 0.07*** 0.10***
(0.06) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Size 0.11*** 0.18*** 0.01 0.21*** 0.02 0.03 0.55***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.80) (0.00) (0.41) (0.13) (0.00)
Notes: Parameters in brackets under correlations are P values.
⁄ Signiﬁcance at the 10% level (two-tailed test).
⁄⁄ Signiﬁcance at the 5% level (two-tailed test).
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level (two-tailed test).
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Fig. 1. Comparison of Pearson correlations using different measures.
H. Wan, K. Zhu / China Journal of Accounting Research 4 (2011) 253–270 263Table 3 presents the Pearson correlation coefﬁcient matrix, in which there is a signiﬁ-
cant positive relationship between operating cashﬂow (Opcash) and investment (Inv),
and also between loan and operating cashﬂow (Opcash). This ﬁnding is consistent with
the previous literature. The correlation between loan and investment proportion (Inv) is
0.18, and the correlation between company scale (Size) and investment proportion (Inv)
is 0.11. The correlations are signiﬁcant at the 1% level (two-tailed test).
If our hypothesis is correct, the improvement in ﬁnancing ability due to the VAT reform
will increase ﬁrm investment. But, the relationship between investment and operating
cashﬂow in different areas will be signiﬁcantly different. We therefore examine the invest-
ment and operating cashﬂow relationship in different areas before and after the VAT re-
form (Fig. 1). The ﬁgure shows that the correlation between investment and operating
cashﬂow increases from 12% to 40% for ﬁrms in the Northeast, a 28% increase, whereas
it changes from 27% to 32% in the other areas, an increase of only 5%.9 This shows that9 Spearman correlation coefﬁcients also produce similar results.
264 H. Wan, K. Zhu / China Journal of Accounting Research 4 (2011) 253–270the correlation between investment and operating cashﬂow increased more signiﬁcantly in
ﬁrms located in the Northeast than in ﬁrms in other areas. This is consistent with our
hypothesis. However, the other two measures, cash holding–cashﬂow sensitivity and bor-
rowing-slack sensitivity, show no signiﬁcant difference between ﬁrms in the Northeast
and other areas before and after the VAT reforms.5. Empirical results and analysis
5.1. Regression analysis
Regression analysis of investment–cashﬂow sensitivity is shown in Table 4. According to
our hypothesis, investment–cashﬂow sensitivity should signiﬁcantly increase following
the VAT reform in the Northeast, which means the regression coefﬁcient on Db  After 
Opcash should be signiﬁcantly positive.
In Table 4, regardless of whether loan is included or not, the coefﬁcient on Db  After 
Opcash is 0.162 and signiﬁcant at the 10% level (two-tailed). This means that as operating
cashﬂow increased by 1%, ﬁrm investment increased by 0.162% in Northeast listed ﬁrmsTable 4
Fixed effects regression of investment–cashﬂow sensitivity.
Dependent variable: Inv
After 0.002 0.002
(0.65) (0.61)
Db  After 0.000 0.001
(0.04) (0.14)
Opcash 0.079*** 0.078***
(3.27) (3.24)
Db  Opcash 0.141* 0.140*
(1.87) (1.86)
After  Opcash 0.060** 0.060*
(1.96) (1.94)
Db  After  Opcash 0.162* 0.162*
(1.73) (1.73)
Tobinq 0.004*** 0.004***
(3.08) (3.06)
Size 0.071*** 0.074***
(6.32) (6.48)
Loan 0.034
(1.43)
Constant 0.702*** 0.732***
(6.70) (6.85)
R-squared 0.08 0.08
Observations 2352 2352
Number of ﬁrms 392 392
Notes: t Values are presented in brackets under the coefﬁcients.
Autocorrelation and heterogeneity are controlled for.
* Signiﬁcance at the 10% level respectively (two-tailed test).
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level respectively (two-tailed test).
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level respectively (two-tailed test).
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million yuan), which we consider to be economically signiﬁcant. Thus, it can be inferred
that the VAT reform had a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on investment–cashﬂow sensitivity in
the Northeast, and overall the sensitivity increased following the VAT reform. This result
is consistent with our hypothesis, which stated that the VAT reform would signiﬁcantly
increase the sensitivity of investment and operating cashﬂow.
The coefﬁcients on the control variables in Table 4 are also consistent with previous
ﬁndings. The coefﬁcient on Tobinq is signiﬁcantly positive, which means that the higher
the growth potential, the more opportunities that are available for investment and the big-
ger the scale of the investment. The coefﬁcient on Size is signiﬁcantly negative, which
means the bigger the company, the smaller the relative investment scale. The coefﬁcient
on Loan is positive but not signiﬁcant, which is not consistent with the loan constraints
theory, but provides support for the soft budget constraints theory. Since most of the listed
companies are government owned, this non-signiﬁcant result is not unexpected.
Under existing theory, cash holding–cashﬂow sensitivity is also used to measure ﬁnan-
cial constraints, as cash holding is considered a negative investment. The result of the VAT
reform is to decrease ﬁrms’ cash holdings. The model to test cash holding–cashﬂow sen-
sitivity is as follows:Cashchgi;t ¼ Opcashi;t þ Dbi þ Afteri;t þ Dbi  Afteri;t þ Dbi  Opcashi;t þ Afteri;t
 Opcashi;t þ Dbi  Afteri;t  Opcashi;t þ Tobinqi;t þ Sizei;t: ð11ÞTable 5 shows the regression results of the cash holding–cashﬂowmodel. The coefﬁcient
on Db  After  Opcash is negative but not signiﬁcant, which means that cash holdings in
companies in the Northeast decreased following the VAT reform. This is consistent with
a decrease in ﬁnancial constraints, although the result is not signiﬁcant. However, we note
that this result is not consistent with the result presented in Table 4. We think cash hold-
ing is affected by many other factors besides investment, such as dividend distributions,
loan repayments and so forth. The correlation between cash holding and cashﬂow is smal-
ler than that between investment and operating cashﬂow. These results suggest that the
cash-holding model is better than the investment–cashﬂow model for measuring ﬁnancial
constraints.
Based on the model used by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), we also use borrowing-
slack sensitivity to measure ﬁnancial constraints. When companies are facing ﬁnancial
slack, they may turn either to their own funds or to external ﬁnancing. External ﬁnancing
is inﬂuenced more by information asymmetry and changes in external ﬁnancing ability
can better reﬂect the change in ﬁnancial constraints. If changes in investment–cashﬂow
sensitivity reﬂect changes in ﬁnancial constraints, an increase in sensitivity in the North-
east after the VAT reform should be interpreted as an increase in ﬁnancial constraints. In
this way, the borrowing-slack model is consistent with theory, thus external funding
should decrease because it is harder to obtain external ﬁnance. The model is as follows:Loanhchgi;t ¼ Deficiti;t þ Dbi þ Afteri;t þ Dbi  Afteri;t þ Dbi  Deficiti;t þ Afteri;t
 Deficiti;t þ Dbi  Afteri;t  Deficiti;t: ð12ÞThe regression in column 1 of Table 6 shows that ﬁnancial constraints did not increase.
The coefﬁcient on Reform  After  Deﬁcit is positive but not signiﬁcant. The coefﬁcient is
0.085 and the T value is 0.80, which is contrary to an increase in ﬁnancial constraints
Table 5
Fixed effects regression of cash–cashﬂow sensitivity.
Dependent variable: Cashchg
After 0.002 0.002
(0.35) (0.28)
Db  After 0.008 0.008
(0.61) (0.61)
Opcash 0.389*** 0.403***
(10.38) (10.82)
Db  Opcash 0.394*** 0.368***
(3.38) (3.18)
After  Opcash 0.097** 0.108**
(2.04) (2.28)
Db  After  Opcash 0.106 0.076
(0.74) (0.53)
Tobinq 0.000 0.001
(0.14) (0.23)
Size 0.136*** 0.149***
(7.78) (8.51)
Inv 0.185***
(5.30)
Constant 1.230*** 1.360***
(7.57) (8.33)
R-squared 0.19 0.20
Observations 2352 2352
Number of ﬁrms 392 392
Notes: t Values are presented in brackets under the coefﬁcients.
Autocorrelation and heterogeneity are controlled for.
 Signiﬁcance at the 10% level respectively (two-tailed test).
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level respectively (two-tailed test).
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level respectively (two-tailed test).
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cally, when internal operating cashﬂow increases it can be used to guarantee increases
in loans. To further test whether the model above is consistent with the expectations of
ﬁnancial constraints theory, we partition the sample by ﬁnancial slack (columns 2–3 in
Table 6). Theoretically, if the VAT reform alters ﬁnancial constraints, then the change in
constraints should be stronger in companies with more ﬁnancial slack. Therefore, we
would expect the sub-sample with slack above 0 to show a signiﬁcant result, whereas
the group with slack below 0 should not. However, from the results in columns 2 and 3,
we ﬁnd that ﬁnancial constraints are not signiﬁcantly affected by the VAT reform, which
is contrary to the result from the investment–cashﬂow model.
The above tests show that when the tax rate changes, investment–cashﬂow sensitivity
may not be an effective way to measure ﬁnancial constraints. On the one hand, tax re-
form does not increase external ﬁnancial constraints, or at least does not make ﬁnancial
constraints stronger. However, the signiﬁcant increase in investment–cashﬂow sensitiv-
ity reported in the regression result is not consistent with the classic theory. On the other
hand, under the same tax reform, the relationship between cash holding–cashﬂow and
Table 6
Fixed effects regression of borrowing-slack sensitivity.
Dependent variable: Loanchg
Full sample Slack < 0 Slack > 0
After 0.016*** 0.019*** 0.002
(3.49) (3.37) (0.15)
Reform  After 0.002 0.015 0.010
(0.11) (0.86) (0.28)
Deﬁcit 0.337*** 0.352*** 0.216***
(13.74) (12.17) (3.48)
Reform  Deﬁcit 0.206*** 0.062 0.412**
(2.60) (0.63) (2.54)
After  Deﬁcit 0.017 0.038 0.064
(0.51) (0.94) (0.84)
Reform  After  Deﬁcit 0.085 0.036 0.245
(0.80) (0.28) (1.17)
Constant 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.010
(8.37) (6.48) (1.40)
R-squared 0.18 0.22 0.10
Observations 2352 1794 558
Number of ﬁrms 392 299 93
Notes: t Values are presented in brackets under the coefﬁcients.
Autocorrelation and heterogeneity are controlled for.
 Signiﬁcance at the 10% level respectively (two-tailed test).
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level respectively (two-tailed test).
*** Signiﬁcance at the 1% level respectively (two-tailed test).
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institutional setting, the latter two models may be better measures of ﬁnancial con-
straints. Of course, the above results are not sufﬁcient to provide full support for this
conclusion, and we believe it is an open question for future research.
5.2. Further discussion and robustness checks
Information asymmetry, agency costs and capital market efﬁciency are the three major
pillars of ﬁnancial theory. Fazzari et al. (1988) point out that the investment-ﬁnancial con-
straints model is a development of the information asymmetry model in Myers and Majluf
(1984). Kaplan and Zingales (1997) criticize the effectiveness of the investment–cashﬂow
model to reﬂect ﬁnancial constraints under information asymmetry, although there is no
indication of the actual factors and the direction of the effect.
This paper provides support for the view of Kaplan and Zingales (1997). We also argue
that enterprise tax subsidies do not increase the degree of information asymmetry be-
tween enterprises and banks, nor do they result in an increase in agency costs. Although
tax subsidies boost corporate cashﬂow through increased investment, enterprise free
cashﬂow does not increase and therefore does not lead to an increase in agency costs.
At the same time, tax subsidies do not change the governance structure of the company
and related agency costs. Therefore, the results cannot be attributed to either a change
in agency costs or to information asymmetry, and therefore extend and strengthen the
ﬁndings of Kaplan and Zingales (1997).
268 H. Wan, K. Zhu / China Journal of Accounting Research 4 (2011) 253–270Is there a potential ‘‘survivorship bias’’ problem from using the balanced panel data
analysis in our research? Because delisting of China-listed companies is rare, the difference
in the sample of balanced and non-balanced data is mainly caused by the listing time and
missing data, rather than ‘‘survivorship bias’’.
We also use different variable deﬁnitions. For instance, we use ‘‘cash payout for acqui-
sition and construction of ﬁxed assets, intangible assets and other long-term assets’’ minus
‘‘cash received from disposal of ﬁxed assets, intangible assets and other long-term assets’’
to proxy for investment. We use the sales growth rate to replace Tobinq as a proxy for
growth opportunities, and use investment data without the tax adjustment to re-analyze
the data. In all cases, the above conclusions still hold.6. Conclusions
In this paper, we explore the internal validity of investment–cashﬂow sensitivity as a
proxy for ﬁnancial constraints from both a theoretical and an empirical perspective. Since
Fazzari et al. (1988), investment–cashﬂow sensitivity has become an important measure
of ﬁnancial constraints and one of the basic models used to test Myers’ and Majluf
(1984) pecking order theory. However, the validity of this measure has been frequently
questioned (Poterba, 1988; Cleary, 1999; Erickson and Whited, 2000; Kaplan and Zingales,
1997, 2000; Almeida et al., 2004; Alti, 2003; Bushman et al., 2008). These scholars have
also proposed alternative measures of ﬁnancial constraints from different perspectives.
This paper discusses the validity of investment–cashﬂow sensitivity as a measure of
ﬁnancial constraints under an exogenous tax reform. Our ﬁndings suggest that the VAT re-
form resulted in corporate investment being more dependent on operating cashﬂow. In
other words, although the investment–cashﬂow sensitivity increased signiﬁcantly, it is
not explained by companies’ ﬁnancial constraints, especially those arising from increased
information asymmetry. For the company and the capital market, the tax rate change
caused by the VAT reform was a relatively exogenous event and should neither increase
the inherent information asymmetry between the company and capital markets, nor lead
to ﬁnancial constraints caused by information asymmetry. However, tax rate changes af-
fect the degree to which investment depends on operating cashﬂows. Therefore, the
investment–cashﬂow relationship may not always reﬂect ﬁrms’ external ﬁnancial con-
straints and it may not be an effective measure of ﬁnancial constraints caused by informa-
tion asymmetry.
In this paper, we compare the investment–cashﬂow sensitivity between listed ﬁrms in
the Northeast and other areas following the VAT reform in Northeast China in 2004. Our
results show that following the VAT reform, investment–cashﬂow sensitivity increased
signiﬁcantly in listed companies in the Northeast. However, the regressions of cash hold-
ing–cashﬂow and borrowing-slack sensitivities show that ﬁnancial constraints in listed
companies in the Northeast did not change signiﬁcantly, and this is consistent with the
theory that ﬁnancial constraints did not increase.
This paper has important theoretical implications. Whether investment–cashﬂow sensi-
tivity is an adequate measure of ﬁnancial constraints is theoretically controversial, and its
effectiveness in China needs further theoretical study and empirical testing. In this paper,
we explore the issue from a tax perspective and the results show that investment–cash-
ﬂow sensitivity is an inadequate measure, whereas the cash–cashﬂow model and borrow-
ing-slack model are relatively more effective. The implications of this paper for Chinese
H. Wan, K. Zhu / China Journal of Accounting Research 4 (2011) 253–270 269researchers is that in China’s newly emerging market, investment–cashﬂow sensitivity is
unsuitable as a measure of ﬁnancial constraints. China has experienced many tax reforms
since the 1980s, which will affect investment–cashﬂow sensitivity without changing
ﬁnancial constraints. This study indicates that the cash holding–cashﬂow and borrow-
ing-slack sensitivity models are relatively free from tax reform inﬂuence and thus are
better measures than investment–cashﬂow sensitivity.Acknowledgments
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